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Leaking: 




WHEN you want to reveal information 
in the public interest, consider leaking. 
To be effective, you need to be very 
careful and to understand both practi-
cal and political aspects. 
___________________________ 
 
Whistleblowing is speaking out in the 
public interest, for example about 
corruption, abuse or hazards to the 
public. Most whistleblowers reveal 
their identity, and many suffer repri-
sals. Therefore, in many situations it is 
more effective to remain anonymous 
and leak. This can be called anony-
mous whistleblowing or public interest 
leaking.2 
 There is a serious double standard 
in leaking. Many politicians and top 
bureaucrats leak information to the 
media, often for personal gain or to 
sound out policies. Such leaks are 
seldom investigated and never prose-
cuted even when they are illegal.3 
However, when lower-level workers 
leak, this is commonly portrayed as a 
serious transgression and sometimes 
investigations are undertaken to iden-
tify the leaker. One of the main pur-
poses of such investigations is to deter 
other workers from becoming leakers. 
It may be the only reason. 
                                                
1 Vice president, Whistleblowers Australia; 
Professor of Social Sciences, University of 
Wollongong. Email: bmartin@uow.edu.au, 
web: http://www.bmartin.cc/. 
For useful comments, I thank AJ Brown, 
Kathy Flynn, Simon Frew, Brendan Jones, 
Cynthia Kardell, Ted Mitew, Ben Morris 
and others who prefer to remain 
anonymous. 
2 This article draws on ideas in Brian 
Martin, Whistleblowing: A Practical Guide 
(Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene Publishing, 
2013), chapter 8. Available at 
http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/13wb.html 
3 David E. Pozen, “The leaky Leviathan: 
why the government condemns and 
condones unlawful disclosures of 
information,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 
127, 2013, pp. 512–635, describes the US 
federal government’s tolerance of leaking 
by high-level officials, especially in the 
area of national security. 
 
 
The focus here is on leaking in the 
public interest. It can be a powerful 
way to challenge damaging and dan-
gerous activities carried out in secret. 
There are three main reasons why it 
can be worthwhile for whistleblowers 
to remain anonymous. First, reprisals 
are less likely: if authorities do not 
know your identity, they can’t take 
action against you. Many whistleblow-
ers who reveal their identity are met 
with petty harassment, ostracism, 
assignment to trivial duties, assign-
ment to onerous duties, hostile 
rumours (for example of poor per-
formance, crimes, mental disorder or 
sexual activities), forced transfers, 
reprimands, referral to psychiatrists, 
demotions, dismissal and blacklisting. 
After reprisals begin, life becomes 
very difficult. Many whistleblowers 
suffer in their careers, their finances, 
their health and their relationships. 
Therefore, it is better to avoid reprisals 
if at all possible. 
 Second, remaining anonymous 
means you can stay on the job and 
continue to collect information and 
leak. As soon as you are identified, 
your access to sensitive information 
will be blocked. Furthermore, efforts 
will be made to hide or destroy 
information about wrongdoing.  
 Third, by remaining anonymous, 
attention is more likely to be on the 
issues revealed than on the person 
making the claims. Employers prefer 
to turn the spotlight on whistleblowers, 
including their personalities and al-
leged flaws, as a means of distracting 
attention from wrongdoing. 
 Even if you decide to reveal your 
identity, it is often worthwhile waiting 
for months or even years while you 
collect plenty of information. As a rule 
of thumb, you need ten times as much 
information as you think you do. This 
is because wrongdoers will try to 
discredit you and the information in 
every way possible. For example, they 
will deny authorship of documents, say 
their words were taken out of context, 
say the policy wasn’t actually imple-
mented, or that they were joking.  
 Another advantage in waiting is that 
you are less likely to be suspected of 
being a potential whistleblower. 
 If you decide to serve the public 
interest by collecting information and 
making it available to outsiders, you 
need to approach this task with great 
care. You are undertaking a vital 
activity, but it is likely that opponents 
will try to discredit or even destroy 




In Australia, there are various laws 
intended to protect whistleblowers 
when they make “public interest 
disclosures.” In some cases, giving 
information to journalists or activists is 
legally protected. However, in prac-
tice, employers often treat whistle-
blowing as illegitimate, even when it is 
entirely lawful.  
 Legal protection is not a guarantee 
against reprisals. Furthermore, em-
ployers are almost never held to 
account for taking reprisals against 
whistleblowers, even when they are 
supposed to be protected legally. The 
lesson here is not to rely on whistle-
blower laws: they may give only an 
illusion of protection.4 This is why 




An illusion of protection 
                                                
4 Brian Martin, “Illusions of whistleblower 
protection,” UTS Law Review, No. 5, 2003, 
pp. 119–130. 
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Even though many employers do 
everything they can to discredit and 
undermine whistleblowers, there is 
considerable support in the wider 
community for speaking out in the 
public interest. By acting responsibly 
— for example, limiting damage to 
third parties — whistleblowers can 
maximise their credibility with co-
workers and wider audiences. It is 
valuable to remember that whistle-
blowing is about serving the public 
interest, not personal agendas. If you 
are doing this, you deserve support and 
admiration. When your employer initi-
ates reprisals, it is valuable to remem-
ber that you are doing the right thing. 
 
Problems and penalties 
In every part of society, there are 
problems that need to be addressed. 
They include business swindles, 
hazardous chemicals, abuse of people 
with disabilities, paedophilia in the 
churches (and elsewhere), harm to 
prisoners, tax rip-offs, nepotism, unfair 
tax laws, environmental damage, and a 
host of others. All deserve attention 
and action.  
 Perpetrators usually prefer to oper-
ate in secret. Whistleblowers, whether 
they are open or anonymous, can play 
an important role in exposing the 
problems. Sometimes, disclosures 
cause wrongdoers to halt their 
activities. 
 The risks from speaking out are 
much greater in some areas than 
others. Probably the most risky areas 
are organised crime, the military, the 
police and national security. The 
problems are not necessarily more 
serious, but the power of the wrongdo-
ers to impose reprisals is much greater. 
 National security is an exceptional 
case, because governments have enor-
mous power and can use it to abuse 
human rights and avoid accountability. 
Anti-terrorism laws give governments 
power against dissent that is far 
beyond what is warranted by the 
dangers involved. For example, some 
pharmaceutical drugs, with known 
dangers, cause tens of thousands of 
deaths, far more than the death toll 
from terrorism.5 Yet the penalties for 
                                                
5 Peter C. Gøtzsche, Deadly Medicines and 
Organised Crime: How Big Pharma Has 
Corrupted Healthcare (London: Radcliffe, 
2013). 
challenging anti-terrorism laws far 
exceed the penalties for speaking out 
about crimes by the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 When penalties for dissent are 
excessive, it is all the more important 
to reveal problems, and to do so with 
the greatest care. To be effective in 
exposing problems, it is worthwhile 
learning from dissenters and opposi-
tion movements in repressive regimes.  
 
The Australian national-security 
connection 
In 2014, the Australian government 
passed draconian anti-terrorism laws 
with extreme penalties for whistle-
blowers and journalists — up to ten 
years in prison — who reveal informa-
tion on certain national security 
matters. Whether these laws will actu-
ally be used remains to be seen, but 
they are obviously intended to deter 
public interest leaking and reporting. 
They will also enable abuses to be 
committed with impunity and hence 
make exposure even more important. 
 Whistleblowers in other fields 
seldom face such extreme penalties, 
but speaking out still can be risky. 
There is much to learn from the 
challenges facing dissidents in high-
security areas. 
 
Learning from challenges to 
repressive regimes 
Many governments in the world are 
highly repressive. They do not allow 
dissent, and may harass, arrest or even 
kill opponents. Despite the dangers, 
courageous citizens take action in 
support of political freedom. It is 
possible to learn from these challenges 
to repressive regimes.6 
 Repressive regimes often provide 
some official means for citizens to 
express discontent. It is possible to 
write to the government, though this 
seldom has any effect. Often there are 
elections, but these are rigged. Often 
most of the mass media are controlled 
by the government, or limited in what 
they can say. Information about alter-
natives is restricted. Trying to change 
the system by lobbying or voting is 
fruitless. 
                                                
6 See “Resisting repression: resources for 
defending Australian freedoms,” 
www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/rr/. 
 The most effective challenges to 
such governments involve a wide 
range of non-standard methods of 
action, such as rallies, strikes, boycotts 
and occupations. Campaigns relying 
on such methods are more effective 
than armed struggle.7 There are several 




Protesters in Peru, 2011 
 
Widespread participation in actions is 
important. Mass rallies are one 
example. However, when joining a 
rally is too risky, there are other 
options. In Turkey in 1997, at the 
initiative of the Citizens Initiative for 
Constant Light, at a particular time in 
the evening people turned off their 
lights as a symbol of resistance. In 
Poland under military rule, the 
government’s official news was broad-
cast at 7pm. To express their opposi-
tion in a safe way, many citizens went 
for a walk at this time, some with their 
televisions in prams. The more repres-
sive the regime, the more important it 
is to find methods of opposition that 
involve only a small risk, so many 
people can join. 
 It is also important that many 
different sectors of the population 
participate. If the opposition is based 
on a single group, such as students or 
workers, it cannot easily build into a 
mass movement. Involving different 
groups also brings in more ideas about 
resistance, making the movement more 
flexible and creative. 
 Campaigns against repression need 
to be resilient: they need to be able to 
survive government attacks. One im-
plication is not to depend too much on 
leaders, who can be discredited, ar-
rested or even killed. A decentralised, 
network-based system for decision-
                                                
7 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, 
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011). 
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making and action is better for 
survival. Large organisations, with 
investments in facilities, staff positions 
and official credibility, have more to 
lose and can more easily be harassed. 
 Alliances are crucially important. 
Governments often use divide-and-rule 
techniques. They demonise certain 
sectors of the population, such as trade 
unionists, religious minorities or stu-
dents, sometimes labelling them ter-
rorists or subversives, and attack them 
directly or via proxies. Other sectors of 
the population, rather than support the 
targeted group, instead look to the 
government for protection, thereby 
cementing its power. 
 In this context, whistleblowers can 
play a valuable role. Those who are 
inside the government apparatus, for 
example in the police, military or 
security services, can provide infor-
mation to opposition groups. Useful 
sorts of information include evidence 
of government abuses, plans and 
methods. For example, when opposi-
tion groups know about government 
plans to infiltrate and discredit them, 
they can better prepare their actions 
and systems. 
 
Dissent is risky 
In a repressive regime, speaking out 
can be very risky, potentially leading 
to arrest and imprisonment or worse. 
In less repressive places, there is 
greater tolerance for free speech and 
political protest. Yet speaking out can 
still be risky. The greatest danger is 
from employers. 
 Large organisations, such as gov-
ernment departments, corporations and 
churches, are usually structured on the 
principles of hierarchy and division of 
labour, in a form that sociologists call 
bureaucracy. The military is a classic 
bureaucracy, with a rigid line of 
command. In a bureaucracy, workers 
are interchangeable cogs. 
 Large organisations like this are 
undemocratic.8 There is little or no free 
speech. Leaders are not accountable 
through elections, and opposition 
                                                
8 Bruce Barry, Speechless: The Erosion of 
Free Expression in the American 
Workplace (San Francisco: Berrett-
Koehler, 2007); David W. Ewing, Freedom 
Inside the Organization: Bringing Civil 
Liberties to the Workplace (New York: 
Dutton 1977). 
movements are often not allowed. 
Basically, a large bureaucratic organi-
sation is similar to an authoritarian 
state.9 This helps explain why whistle-
blowing is so risky. A whistleblower is 
similar to a lone political dissident in a 
repressive regime, which is why whis-
tleblowers can learn from techniques 
for political dissent.  
 Imagine standing alone against a 
dictator — it’s brave, but seldom a 
good strategic move. It’s usually more 
effective to be part of a movement for 
change. When you have allies, you are 
safer and there’s a better prospect of 
success. There is strength in numbers, 
and also many more skills, resources 
and contacts. 
 If there is an organised opposition 
movement within your workplace, this 
is a good place to seek allies. If not, 
then look outside the organisation, for 
example to action groups on the envi-
ronment, health, honest government, 
human rights, social justice or what-
ever is most relevant. 
 If you are on the inside, with infor-
mation, and others are on the outside, 
with resources and capacity to take 
action, you can contribute most by 
linking up with those on the outside. 
By remaining anonymous, you can 





When leaking is not a good idea 
Leaking is only possible and suitable 
in certain circumstances.  
 • If you’ve already spoken out, and 
especially if you’ve already suffered 
reprisals, you have limited opportuni-
ties for obtaining inside information 
                                                
9 Deena Weinstein, Bureaucratic 
Opposition: Challenging Abuses at the 
Workplace (New York: Pergamon, 1979) 
and leaking it anonymously. So being 
public might be better. 
 • If you are the only person with 
certain information, you probably 
won’t be able to remain anonymous: 
you will be identified immediately. So 
it might be better to gather more 
information before leaking, or first 
obtain a new job. 
 • To be an effective leaker, you 
need to be an actor: you need to 
behave like you do normally. If there is 
a witch-hunt for the leaker, you need to 
pretend that you are not the leaker, and 
to tell lies if necessary. If you’re not 
able or comfortable doing this, leaking 
may not be for you. To be really effec-
tive, you may need to join the search 
for the leaker and even contribute ideas 
to how to track down the leaker. 
 • Sometimes leaking may put you 
and others close to you in serious 
danger. In such situations, you need to 
balance benefits and costs, and con-
sider different strategies. 
 Strangely enough, when the danger 
is high, it may be safer to reveal your 
identity, because more people will 
know you have spoken out and will be 
aware if anything is done to you. For 
example, sometimes witnesses to 
crimes by criminal syndicates are put 
in supposedly safe locations under 
police protection. But if the criminals 
have infiltrated the police, then your 
life can be in danger and no one will 
know. If you are a public face, you 
might actually be safer. 
 
Who can receive leaks  
There are several potential recipients: 
journalists, activists, WikiLeaks and 
similar services, and the public 
directly. 
 Journalists can use your informa-
tion to write stories and publicise 
problems. You can remain completely 
anonymous by sending material by 
email or post, or you can talk via a safe 
phone, or you can agree to meet. How 
much personal contact you make with 
the journalist depends on several 
factors, including how much you trust 
the journalist, how risky it is for you to 
have your identity known to anyone, 
and how much you want to build a 
relationship for ongoing leaks. 
 The best sort of journalist to contact 
is one who has a good reputation and a 
track record of exposing problems. It is 
important to remember that journalists 
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and their editors seek stories they 
judge newsworthy, for example in-
volving conflict, personalities, local 
relevance and current events. If your 
material is too old, too technical, too 
complicated or too risky — risky 
because it might open the news outlet 
to legal or government reprisals — 
then there may be no story, or only an 
inadequate one. Look at what other 
stories have been run to see whether 
your material fits the usual mould. 
 An inexperienced or careless jour-
nalist may compromise your identity. 
Many journalists are seriously over-
loaded and therefore may not have the 
time to give your story the attention, 
care and security precautions it de-
serves. 
 If you have an ongoing relationship 
with a journalist, you should arrange 
codes and communication systems in 
case of danger, for example to cancel 
meetings at short notice or even to shut 
down contact altogether. Multiple 
methods of contact, for example email 
accounts in different names, can be 
useful. 
 Journalists should copy printed 
documents received and destroy origi-
nals, and similarly transform electronic 
files to eliminate identifying informa-
tion, for example by putting them into 
plain text. Journalists should not keep 
files on site that can be obtained 
through a search warrant. 
 In Australia, anti-terrorism laws 
may deter journalists from covering 
some national security stories. One 
alternative: go to international media. 
Or go to activists, use leaking sites or 




 Activists can use your information 
in several ways. By providing insights 
into how your organisation works, they 
can better plan their campaigns. For 
example, if they know there are differ-
ences of opinion, or discontent, in your 
organisation, activists may be able to 
propose options or design protests 
more effectively. Especially important 
to activists is information about the 
impact of their campaigns. 
 What sort of activist group? It 
depends on where you work. There are 
groups concerned about education, 
human rights, environment, labour, 
peace, welfare and a host of other 
issues. However, sometimes there’s no 
suitable group. 
 Activists are less likely to be famil-
iar with using leaked information. 
They may not have good systems to 
protect your identity. Proceed cau-
tiously. It’s probably better to ap-
proach an individual with a lot of 
experience, and someone with a repu-
tation for maintaining confidentiality. 
 Remember that most people like to 
gossip. Knowing about a leaker may 
be a secret that is too hard for some to 
keep to themselves. If in doubt, don’t 
reveal your identity. You can be an 
effective leaker by sending messages 
from an anonymous email account or 
putting documents in a mailbox. 
 Remember also that activists may 
be suspicious of you. They may worry 
that you are a government agent trying 
to mislead or entrap them. So proceed 
gradually, and provide information to 
establish your credibility. Or try one of 
the other options. 
 Leaking sites are a good option if 
you have important documents. A 
well-designed leaking site, like 
WikiLeaks, provides strong protection 
that your identity will not be revealed. 
Not all sites do this, so check out the 
site carefully. Another well established 
leaking site, predating WikiLeaks, is 
Cryptome.  
 Leaking sites may or may not give 
your material wider visibility. Too 
often, material just sits on the site and 
no one notices. So you may need to 
contact journalists or activists to let 
them know about the documents. 
 Direct publication: you can post 
material online. You can set up a 
website, a Facebook page or a blog, or 
you can put documents on a site like 
Scribd. Then you can notify journalists 
or activists or go directly to your target 
audience. For example, if you have 
email addresses, you can send mes-
sages to members of an organisation. 
The advantage of posting material — 
documents or written commentary or 
both — is that you control exactly 
what you want to say, without relying 
on journalists or activists as intermedi-
aries. 
 
Choose recipients of your leaks very 
carefully. You may need to take as 
much care in selecting and cultivating 
journalists or activists as you do 
gathering material to give to them. 
Edward Snowden gathered a vast 
quantity of data about the US National 
Security Agency’s spying operations, 
but that was the easy part. He carefully 
selected the journalist he wanted to 
receive the documents and then spent 
months trying to interest him in the 
story. His efforts paid off in the 
biggest stories imaginable. The lesson 
is to be selective in choosing recipients 
and to be patient and persistent in 
building a relationship with them.10 
 
Remaining anonymous 
Leaking may seem dangerous because 
we read about leakers who were ex-
posed, most famously Daniel Ellsberg 
and Chelsea Manning. Most leakers, 
however, remain anonymous as long as 
they want to — so we never hear about 
them.11 
                                                
10 Brian Martin, “Learning from Snowden,” 
http://comments.bmartin.cc/2014/06/26/lea
rning-from-snowden/. For informative 
accounts of Snowden’s experience, see 
Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: 
Edward Snowden, the NSA and the 
Surveillance State (London: Hamish 
Hamilton 2014); Michael Gurnow, The 
Edward Snowden Affair: Exposing the 
Politics and Media Behind the NSA 
Scandal (Indianapolis: Blue River Press, 
2014); Luke Harding, The Snowden Files: 
The Inside Story of the World’s Most 
Wanted Man (London: Guardian Books 
2014). 
11 On leaking, see The Art of Anonymous 
Activism: Serving the Public While 
Surviving Public Service (Washington, DC: 
Project on Government Oversight; 
Government Accountability Project; Public 
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 Remaining anonymous is possible, 
but it takes care, especially if you work 
in a sensitive area where security is 
taken seriously. Because each situation 
is different, there are no general rules 
about how cautious you need to be. 
What is important is to think through 
how others might track you down. 
Imagine that your boss, a workmate or 
an outside investigator were given the 
task of finding the leaker. What would 
they do? Or imagine that you were 
assigned the task of finding a leaker. 
How would you proceed? By thinking 
through steps likely to be taken, you 
have a better chance of avoiding traps. 
 Suppose the investigator goes into 
your computer and checks all your 
files and goes into your email account 
and checks all your messages. That 
means you shouldn’t leave any trace of 
your activity on your computer or 
email. So pay cash to buy a cheap 
computer, for example a tablet or 
netbook. Make sure it is not connected 
to the web, disable GPS and do all 
your writing on it.  
 
 
Buy a cheap tablet. 
 
Go to a public computer (in a library or 
cafe) far from your home, taking along 
a USB from your separate computer, 
and send emails from a new email 
account. Or use free wifi in a busy 
place.12 Avoid using social media 
                                                    
Employees for Environmental 
Responsibility, 2002), especially pp. 7–16; 
Kathryn Flynn, “The practice and politics 
of leaking,” Social Alternatives, vol. 30, 
no. 1, 2011, pp. 24–28; Nicky Hager and 
Bob Burton, Secrets and Lies: The 
Anatomy of an Anti-environmental PR 
Campaign (Craig Potton, 1999), pp. 240–
247. All available at 
http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/rr/. 
12 For even greater security, use a live 
USB-only operating system such as Tails 
(https://tails.boum.org/) and, for continuous 
posting, a VPN that doesn’t collect data 
logs.  
during this time, as it can compromise 
your anonymity. 
 If you plan to send files, avoid 
standard word-processing software; 
use secure open-source software in-
stead, or put text into the body of 
emails. If you want to be ultra-
cautious, hand-write your message and 
key it in at a public computer. Avoid 
locations where your presence can be 
recorded on closed-circuit TV moni-
toring and avoid carparks where your 
car’s licence number might be re-
corded. If you’re not sure about the 
location of security cameras, you can 
reduce risk by wearing sunglasses and 
a hat — as long as this doesn’t make 
you more conspicuous. If you’re 
having an ongoing conversation with a 
journalist, use a different public 
computer each time. 
 Suppose you’ve made a major leak 
and there’s a massive hunt for the 
leaker. The police go into your house 
and take all your electronic devices — 
phones and computers. By this time 
you should have deleted all incrimi-
nating files from your computer, using 
a secure-delete function so even an 
expert cannot recover files. Even 
better, after deleting the files, you 
dispose of the separate computer 
entirely. Your regular home computer 
should never contain material relevant 
to your leaking. 
 Suppose the investigator obtains 
telephone company records and looks 
for a record of a call to a journalist or 
other recipient. You need a phone 
connection that can’t be linked to you. 
So use public phones or arrange to use 
a secure open-source messaging 
system — not Skype — from a public 
computer (voice or text message only). 
Even safer is to avoid calls altogether, 
instead sending quick emails so your 
time online is limited. 
 If you want to copy documents, you 
need to be careful. Some photocopiers 
can be set up so that every copy has an 
identifying mark. So use a public 
                                                    
For keeping Internet activity anonymous, 
you can use Tor 
(https://www.torproject.org/) and use an 
anonymous email site such as hushmail 
(https://www.hushmail.com/), not 
including any personal information. Spies 
can use network analysis to track the 
source of ongoing communication, so be 
careful about this approach for more than 
occasional use. 
photocopier, or make multiple copies 
using several different photocopiers. 
 Even more devious is a process 
sometimes used for highly sensitive 
documents. Each recipient’s copy has a 
slight difference in the text — for 
example, an insignificant word is 
replaced by a synonym — so that if the 
document is leaked, the leaker can be 
identified. This level of monitoring is 
unusual.  
 Usually you will not have to deal 
with sophisticated defences against 
leaking. At some national security 
offices, security is so lax that it’s 
possible to obtain paper or digital files 
with ease.13  
 
 
Very few police dogs are trained to 
detect USB drives. 
 
A more common problem you will 
face is avoiding making simple 
mistakes. Many leakers are caught 
because they leave pages in the 
photocopier or leave their computer 
monitors open to confidential docu-
ments, or send emails from their work 
computer. If you avoid simple mis-
takes, you are pretty likely to be safe. 
 The same principle applies to online 
precautions: use methods with which 
you are familiar and comfortable, 
because you are less likely to make 
mistakes. If you’ve never used encryp-
tion, VPN or open source software, 
don’t start just before you begin 
leaking. Instead, learn how to use these 
techniques well in advance, or just use 
something you’ve used before. Meet-
ing a contact face-to-face, away from 
electronic devices, remains a depend-
able way of avoiding surveillance; 
arranging such meetings is the hard 
part. 
 Often it is better to leak information 
bit by bit, over a period of time, rather 
                                                
13 For a revealing account, see Sibel 
Edmonds, Classified Woman: The Sibel 
Edmonds Story. A Memoir (Alexandria, 
Virginia: Sibel Edmonds, 2012). 
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than in one giant batch. When journal-
ists or other recipients write stories, the 
publicity may encourage others to 
confirm information or leak new 
material, so the area of suspicion is 
diffused and investigators are con-
fused. Furthermore, a drip-by-drip 
leaking strategy can lead to greater 
publicity, as stories continue to appear. 
Snowden’s revelations had a greater 
impact because they were gradually 
revealed over weeks and months. 
 Another way you can be identified 
is through your words and behaviour. 
Ask an honest friend how good you are 
at keeping confidences. Chelsea 
Manning, who obtained and leaked one 
of the biggest collections of documents 
in history, may never have been caught 
except for talking about it. The lesson 
is to never tell anyone that you are the 
leaker — except maybe years or 
decades later when there is no risk. 
 After you have leaked, you need to 
pretend that you are not the leaker. 
You need to behave just as you would 
if you hadn’t been the leaker. This is a 
form of acting. Contrary to popular 
opinion, research shows that most 
people can lie convincingly and that 
few people can detect lies, so you can 
probably do it well, especially if you 
believe in what you are doing.14 It is 
legitimate to lie in a good cause, for 
example in occupied Europe during 
World War II when Nazis came to 
people’s houses asking whether there 
were any Jews inside.  
 
 
Pinocchio hides his revealing nose 
 
Think through in advance how you 
would behave if you were told that 
someone else had leaked information 
from your section. (Maybe they did!) 
Then be prepared to act in the same 
way if you are the leaker. If you are 
convincing, you might even be put in 
charge of finding the leaker! Be care-
                                                
14 Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to 
Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and 
Marriage (New York: Norton, 2009). 
ful. Sometimes workers suspected of 
being leakers are sent material or given 
tasks as a means of trapping them, or 
sending them a warning. 
 
If you are discovered 
If your identity as the leaker becomes 
known, you are likely to be subject to 
reprisals. If you are in a dangerous 
area, such as organised crime, police or 
military, you might be at risk of 
assault, frame-ups and imprisonment. 
 If you expect reprisals to be severe, 
it is often better to get out and go 
public. Accept that your career is over, 
leave the job (and avoid immediate 
reprisals), let everyone know you are a 
whistleblower and seek public visi-
bility. 
 Andrew Wilkie worked for the 
Office of National Assessments. In 
March 2003, he publicly questioned 
the Australian government’s rationale 
for joining the invasion of Iraq. Wilkie 
didn’t bother complaining to his bosses 
or making an official disclosure. 
Instead, he went straight to the media 
with his message, resigning from his 
job. Wilkie was courageous in speak-
ing out, sacrificing his career. He had 
maximum impact and avoided reprisals 
inside ONA. He could have been 
charged with a crime and gone to 
prison. Because he became well known 
— and gained many supporters — the 






The lesson from Wilkie’s experience is 
that to have maximum impact and 
reduce reprisals, resign and seek 
publicity and public support.15 Don’t 
rely on protection from whistleblower 
laws. They seldom work and often 
serve to reduce exposure of problems.  
 Many Australian public servants are 
afraid of speaking out because of the 
harsh laws against unauthorised disclo-
sures, but these laws are hardly ever 
used. They serve mostly to scare 
workers into silence. You may be safer 
than you realise.  
 
Conclusion 
Secrecy is justified as protecting the 
public, but often it serves to protect 
powerful groups from scrutiny, and 
sometimes is a cover for crimes and 
abuse. In such circumstances, exposure 
is a public service.  
 If you’re going to expose problems, 
leaking can be the best option, espe-
cially when you can remain in the job 
and continue to leak. To leak effec-
tively, you need to be cautious and 
patient, perhaps waiting months or 
even years after collecting information. 
You need to choose your recipients 
very carefully. You need to continue in 
your job just as you would if you were 
not the leaker. You need a plan to 
minimise potential damage to the 
recipient of your disclosures in case of 
discovery. If you are discovered, you 
need to be prepared to resign and go 
public. 
 As a leaker through all this, you will 
obtain no recognition — no praise 
from bosses or co-workers, and no 
personal publicity. You need to be 
satisfied in your mind that you are 
doing the right thing. Sometimes that 
is the greatest reward. 
 
Postscript 
This is a work in progress, and is likely 
to become out of date in light of 
technological developments. If you 
have comments on how to improve 
this document, please let me know (see 
footnote 1). You are welcome to 
circulate it, especially to potential 
leakers. A separate pdf is available at 
www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/rr/
in the section on leaking. 
 
                                                
15 Brian Martin, “Bucking the system: 
Andrew Wilkie and the difficult task of the 
whistleblower,” Overland, No. 180, Spring 
2005, pp. 45–48, 
www.bmartin.cc/pubs/05overland.html. 
